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Abstract 
The objective of the study was to assess the impact of financial sector deregulation reforms 
on savings, credit to private sector, and the economic growth of Nigeria from 1970 to 2009. 
Upon investigation of the long run and short run impact of financial deregulation on the  
selected macroeconomic variables, using the ARDL-bound test approach, it was discovered, 
that in both long and short run, financial deregulation had no significant impact on the real 
interest rate, and if any, its effect suggest a negative; therefore not in conformity with the 
McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, that suggest that deregulation of the financial system enhances 
competition in the system and therein causes interest rate to be positive. However, increases 
in savings and the credit to private sector observed in the study, can hardly be attributed to 
financial deregulation (or the real interest rate) as its effect in the short run were minimally 
positive, and utterly negative in the long-run. The same effect was evidence in the economic 
growth variable. The study therefore concluded that the shifting effects from positive in the 
short run to  negative in the long run, is attributable to lack of continuity in the 
implementation of financial deregulation reforms and absence of competition in the industry. 
All in all, financial deregulation did not induce positive real interest rate (to encourage 
savings). Suggesting that, interest rate on deposit has not been the major factor that propelled 
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depositors to save in Nigeria, but rather the lack of investment alternatives outside financial 
assets.  
 
Keywords: Financial Deregulation, Savings, Credit to Private Sector, Interest Rate and 
Economic Growth, Complementarity Hypothesis, and the ARDL-Bound Testing 
 
 
Introduction 
Financial Deregulation/ liberalization is a matter of degree, and does not imply a shift 
to total laissez-faire. It entails the removal or relaxation of regulations affecting the type of 
business financial firms may undertake, the type of firms permitted to deal in the particular 
markets, or the terms on which dealing is allowed. Regulations which have been relaxed 
include controls on interest rates at which banks can lend or borrow, controls on operations 
by banks outside their country of registration and restrictions on the types of business 
particular financial institutions can transact, direct credit abolition and exchange rate 
deregulation. Deregulation has been favoured as it leads to more competition and efficiency 
gains, causing both developed and developing economies to incorporate such policies into 
their Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP, 1986 for Nigeria) as opposed to its opposite; 
financial regulation or repression. Although financial deregulation reform can increase the 
efficiency by channelling resources into productive use, its impact on the quantity of savings, 
credit and economic growth is theoretically ambiguous. In as much as the ambiguility can be 
as a result of country specific factors, it however, can be traced to empirical measuration of 
financial deregulation and method of estimation. On the former (measuration of financial 
deregulation), a good number of research, have settled for partial measures of financial 
deregulation via the adoption of partial proxies (on account that proxies need not be actual 
estimates); proxies like the real interest rate (Oshikoya, 1992; Seck and El-nil, 1993; 
Matsheka, 1998), M2/GDP (Reinhart et al, 2005; Odhiambo, 2006; Nwazeaku and Okpara, 
2010), credit to the private sector/GDP (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2007; Shohnoushi, 2008) , 
liquidity ratio (Allen and NdiKumana, 2000; Aziakpono, 2004), total liabilities/GDP (Achy, 
2003). Others simply measure financial deregulation/deregulation using traditional dummies 
of 0 – No deregulation/deregulation and 1- liberalized (Okpara, 2010), while others, having 
observed the partiality in financial deregulation measures above resolve to constructing index, 
the index in some cases, are not comprehensive to capture deregulation as they structure are 
limited to deregulation in the money market (Fowowe, 2008). True as claim that proxies need 
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not be actual, economics and econometrics does not limit optimization to end but extends it to 
means. Deregulation is a matter of degree (arising from adoption, changes or combinations of 
reforms) that reflects the gradual changes in the entire financial system. It  far exceed 
measuring with a single indicator that only reflects a fraction effect, or using dummy 
extremes of  0 and 1 that ignore the gradual progression, or an  index limited to a fraction of 
the financial market, ignoring the inter-relationships of between markets. Since poor, partial, 
extreme and wrong measurement, would imply poor, partial, extreme and wrong conclusions 
and recommendations, this study, has an objective of measuring financial deregulation, 
testing its effect on domestic savings, credit to the private sector, real interest rate and 
economic growth in Nigeria using time series data soured from the Central Bank of Nigeria 
and the World Bank Development Indicator spanning 1970-2009, to confirm the truth in 
McKinnon’s Hypothesis when regressed for long and short run effect using an ARDL model. 
 
Methodology, Estimation and Results 
To estimate the long run and short run relationships among the running variables, we 
employ the ARDL Bound test approach as presented by Pesaran et al (2001), as it test for 
both long and short run simultaneously, and absorbs the problems of regressing at different 
levels of integration I(0) or I(1), thus requiring no pretest like the ADF, DF-GLS, PP test and 
other stationarity test. However, to  satisfy the curiosity of no second differences I(2), we 
conduct a DF-GLS unit root test for caution (see appendix table 2). The model for the study 
drawn from a dual complementarity hypothesis augmented with financial development index 
(measurement, table 1 in appendix) and represented below; 
 
L(SavGdp) = α0 + α1LGDP + α2L(Crpvt/Gdp) + α3RINTr + α4FinLB + μt  ………………… (8) 
 
Where; LSavGdp = log of savings as a percent of GDP, LGDP = log of real GDP,  
 
LCrpvt/Gdp = log of credit to the private sector/GDP, RINTr = Real Interest Rate, FinLB= 
Financial Deregulation Index.  
 
The ARDL approach involves estimating the conditional error correction version of 
the ARDL model for variables under estimation. The Augmented ARDL is given by the 
following (Pesaran and Pesaran 1997: Pesaran and Shin, 2001): 
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Equation 8, when specified for Total Domestic Financial Savings to GDP ratio, in the form of 
a conditional ARDL (Autoregressive Distributed Lag) model in such a general form 
becomes: 
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Considering the other endogenous variables in the base model; Growth of Credit to 
Private Sector per GDP, Real Interest Rate, and Economic Growth Variables- GDP, we can 
therefore hypothetically specify from equation (10), a Conditional ARDL for Credit to 
Private Sector to GDP ratio: 
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Also, specifying for Economic Growth proxied by the GDP in ARGL form becomes: 
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Also, specifying for Real Interest Rate in ARGL form becomes: 
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In the above equations, the terms α1-α5 with the summation signs represents the error 
correction or short run dynamic, while the terms with λs represent the long run relationship, εt 
is the error correction term or white noise, α0 is the intercept or drift, the Ls in front of 
specific variables as in equation 8, are Log indicators, Δs are the first differences, and ks are 
the respective specific optimum lag orders of the variables entering the ARDL-ECM. The 
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financial deregulation index/ measure, is majorly regarded as a policy dependent variables 
thus we consider it to be exogenous variables in the study. 
The implementation of the ARDL approach estimation is as follows; Regress selected 
equation (10-13) using OLS, choosing the optimal lag combination (ks) in the short run 
dynamics that minimizes the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) (R-squared increases). At 
these optimum lag combination, test if the lagged (one) variables- long run parameters, are 
jointly significant, i.e., if the null hypothesis of no cointegration, against the alternative 
hypothesis of the existence of a long run-cointegrated relationship using F-test such as; 
 
Ho: λ1 = λ2 = … = λn = 0 
H1: λ1 = λ2 = … = λn ≠ 0 
 
The asymptotic distribution of critical values is obtained for cases in which all 
regressors are purely I(1) as well as when the regressors are purely I(0) or mutually 
cointegrated. These hypotheses can be examined using the standard Wald or F-statics. The F-
test has a non-standard distribution which depends upon; (i) whether variables included in the 
ARDL model are I(1) or I(0), (ii) the number of regressors, (iii) whether the ARDL contains 
an intercept and/or a trend and (iv) the sample size (Narayan, 2005).  The F-Statistic has two 
sets of critical values (compiled by Pesaran et al. (2001)). One set assumes that all variables 
are of order I(0) and the other set assumes that they are all of order  I(1). If the calculated F-
statistics “falls Above the Upper Bound Critical Value” (corresponding to all I(1) variables) 
of F-Tabulated developed by Pesaran, then “the null of no co-integration can be rejected”. 
This implies that co-integration or long run relationship exists.  If the computed F-statistics 
“falls Below the Lower Bound Critical Value”, then “the null hypothesis of no co-integration 
cannot be rejected”:  this implies that all variables are I(0), the variables are deemed not to be 
co-integrated. If it “lies between the two Bounds”, the “result seems inconclusive”. And an 
alternative test required. (Pesaran, et al. 2001: Narayan, 2005: Rahila et al, 2010). Next, we 
create a lagged error-correction term (ECMt-1) out of the fitted values of the lagged long-run 
variables (the λ terms), and replace the individual lagged terms with the ECMt-1. If, when the 
equation is re-estimated at the SIC-minimized lags, if the coefficient on the ECMt-1 is 
negative and significant, we can say that there is a long-run relationship among the variables. 
If cointegration is established, we can form long-run coefficient estimates from Equation (1) 
by normalizing the estimates for λ2, λ 3, λ 4, λ 5, on the estimate for λ1. In the third step, once 
cointegration is established, the conditional ARDL (k1, k2, k3, k4, k5) long-run model for the 
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dependent variable(s) can be estimated. This involves employing the optimal lag orders of the 
ARDL (k1, k2, k3, k4, k5) model in the five variables using Schwarz Information Criteria 
(SIC). In the fourth and final step, we obtain the short-run dynamic parameters by estimating 
an error correction model associated with the long-run estimated (ECMt-1). Then we test for 
stability; CUSUM and CUSUMSQ. 
 
The Results 
The calculated F-statistics is computed for the joint significance of variables with λs 
signs in the above equation. When one lag is imposed, there is a strong evidence of existence 
of cointegration among the variables. The F-value, expressed as FSAV/GDP (LSAV/GDP| 
LRGDP, LCrPVT/GDP, RINTr, FinLB)  is 5.2025 given the optimal lag combination of the 
ARDL (1, 1, 0, 1, 1), is higher than the upper bound critical Value 4.01 at 5% significance 
level (see table 2 in appendix), Thus the existence of a co-integrating long-run relationship 
among the variables.  
 
Long-run Parameter Estimates and Tests for Model 10. (1, 1, 0, 1, 1) 
This is long run model 10: OLS, using observations 1970-2009 (T = 40) 
Dependent variable: LSAVGDP 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
Const -0.203992 0.293521 -0.6950 0.49165  
LGdp 0.0173049 0.038712 0.4470 0.65762  
LCrpvt/Gdp 0.923443 0.0964826 9.5711 2.64e
-011
 *** 
RINTr -0.00459464 0.00213909 -2.1479 0.03872 ** 
FinLB -0.0554189 0.0183448 -3.0210 0.00469 *** 
Note: ***, ** and * Indicates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
R-squared  0.8572  Adjusted R-squared  0.8409 
Durbin's h 1.0939  P-value(F)  2.57e
-14
 
Schwarz criterion -19.8618  Hannan-Quinn -25.25294 
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Short-run Parameter Estimates and Tests for Model 10. (1, 1, 0, 1, 1) 
This is short-run model 10: OLS, using observations 1972-2009 (T = 38) 
Dependent variable: ΔLSavGdp 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
Const -0.0137 0.02338 -0.5899 0.5600  
ΔLSavGdpt-1 0.1982 0.1088 1.8215 0.0792 * 
ΔLGdpt 0.03268 0.0549 0.5950 0.5566  
ΔLGdpt-1 -0.0110 0.05578 -0.1977 0.8447  
ΔLCrpvtGdpt 0.6974 0.1070 6.5196 <0.00001 *** 
ΔRINTrt -0.0011 0.0017 -0.6207 0.5398  
ΔRINTrt-1 -0.0012 0.0014 -0.8613 0.3964  
ΔFinLBt -0.0169 0.0282 -0.6001 0.5532  
ΔFinLBt-1 0.08966 0.0265 3.3858 0.0021 *** 
ECML t-1 -0.4973 0.1253 -3.9690 0.0005 *** 
Note: ***, ** and * Indicates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
R-squared  0.7845  Adjusted R-squared  0.7152 
F(9, 28)  11.3252  P-value(F)  3.14e
-07
 
Author’s Analysis. 
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Extracted Results for Long and Short Run ARDL Equations ( 11-13) 
Table A: 
  Long Run Effects: Regressors 
 LGdp LSavGdp LCrpvt/Gdp RINTr FinLB R
2
 DW 
Equation11: 
LCrpvt/Gdp 
0.0656* 0.7835*** - 0.0057*** +ve Insignificant 0.89 1.52 
Equation12: LGDP - +ve  Insignificant 1.4061* -ve Insignificant -0.0675** 0.81 1.84 
Equation 13: RINTr -ve Insignificant -25.3482*** 37.1321*** - -ve Insignificant 0.27 1.93 
Note: ***, **,*Indicates critical values; 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
F-Test Values for H0 or H1: 
Equation 11: The FCrpvt/Gdp (LCrpvt/Gdp| LSavGdp, LGDP, RINTr, FinLB) = 4.43382 for ARDL (1, 0, 0, 0, 1) > 4.01 @ 5% 
Equation 12: The FGdp (LGDP | LSav/Gdp, LCrpvt/Gdp, RINTr, FinLB) = 4.19436 for ARDL (3, 2, 2, 1, 0) > 4.01 @ 5% 
Equation 13: The FRINTr (RINTr | LSavGdp, LGDP, LCrpvt/Gdp, FinLB) = 6.14291 for ARDL (3, 2, 0, 0, 1) > 4.01 @ 5% 
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Table B: 
Short Run ARDL Effects: Regressors (and Relevant Lag) 
 ∆LGDPt ∆LSavGdpt ∆LCrpvt/Gdpt ∆RINTrt ∆FinLBt ECM R
2
 Adj R
2
 
Lag of 
Dependent 
Variable 
Equation11: 
∆LCrpvt/Gdpt 
Insignifican
t 
0.7611*** - 0.0054*** 
Lag (1) = 
- 0.0691** 
-0.6038*** 0.78 0.73 
Lag one 
significant and 
Positive (0.2021) 
Equation12: 
∆LGDPt 
-  0.8517* 
Lag (2) =  
-1.0024** 
Insignifican
t 
Insignifican
t 
-0.4866*** 0.45 0.12 Insignificant 
Equation 13: 
∆RINTrt 
Insignifican
t 
Insignifican
t 
Insignificant - -0.108** -0.765*** 0.77 0.67 
Lag one 
significant and 
negative  
(-0.2826) 
Note: ***, **,*Indicates critical values; 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Source: Authors’ Estimation. 
{See CUSUM and CUSUMSQ stability test in appendix} 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
The Autoregressive Distributed Lagged (ARDL) analysis and the McKinnon 
Complimentary Hypothesis (a dual model of the demand for Real money balance and 
investment model), were used to analyze how financial deregulation relates to savings, credit 
to private sector and economic growth in the long and short run. The results reveal that:  
 In both the long run and the short run, financial deregulation had no significant impact 
on the real interest rate, and if any, its effect suggest a negative effect on the real interest rate 
and therefore not in conformity with the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, that suggest that 
financial deregulation of the financial system enhances competition in the system and therein 
causes interest rate to be positive. 
 With respect to total domestic financial savings, immediate past financial deregulation 
(that is financial deregulation lag one) displayed a minimal positive effect, though significant, 
this effect was not long lived as it turns to a significant negative effect in the long run. A 
similar fashion is observed in the credit to the private sector (significantly negative effect in 
the short run and insignificant in the long run) and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (its 
effect is significantly positive to the immediate past reform in the short run and insignificant 
in the long run). The trend in shifting effects (in the short run to long run) is attributed 
majorly to inconsistency or (lack of continuity) in the implementation of financial 
deregulation reforms and the unhealthy state of the financial sector.  
 Just like the financial deregulation effect, real interest rate acted as predicted when its 
response to reform is negative and insignificant. Firstly, insignificant in the short run and 
significantly negative in the long run when in respect to domestic financial savings. As for 
the Credit to Private Sector, it showed positive effects which where however relatively too 
small in both long and short run. On the Gross Domestic Product, real interest rate is 
insignificantly negative in both short and long run. 
 On the link between the variables, financial deregulation did not bring about positive 
real interest rate which is supposed to encourage savings. Therefore we conclude that interest 
on deposit has not been the major determining or encouraging factor that propelled depositor 
to save or increase savings, (but rather the lack of investment alternatives outside financial 
assets). However, increases in current savings in the short and long run, increased the credit 
to private sector, which in turn does not translate to economic growth in immediate short run, 
but significantly positive in the long run, especially when the immediate lag is considered. 
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A battery of explanations has been advanced for the obvious failure of financial 
deregulation programmes to address the problems of Nigeria’s financial system. The 
recurrent rationalization is the incompleteness of the reform and lack of competition in the 
financial sector especially at commercial banking level. Hence, the recommendation of a 
stable macro economy, commitment in financial deregulation policy implementation and 
central bank involvement in commercial banking to operate at low interest level, thereby 
inducing competition. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Financial Deregulation Index: Deregulation Variables and Years  
Year 
BPDR IRL PRIDC DSCA FEB-
DBL 
EXCL-
DFEM 
CAPML-
EDH 
Degree Of 
Deregulation 
1970 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1971 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1972 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1973 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1974 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1975 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1976 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1977 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1978 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1979 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1982 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1983 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1984 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1985 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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1986 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1987 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 
1988 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 
1989 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 
1990 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 4 
1991 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
1992 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 5 
1993 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
1994 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 4 
1995 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 5 
1996 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 5 
1997 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 5 
1998 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 5 
1999 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 5 
2000 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 5 
2001 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 5 
2002 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 5 
2003 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 5 
2004 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 5 
2005 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 5 
2006 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
2007 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
2008 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
2009 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Note: The table shows a summary of financial deregulation policy index edged from the idea 
of the principal component analysis. Each cell gives the presence or absence of deregulation 
in that variable. 0 indicating no deregulation and 1 indicating deregulation. The last column is 
the summation of the total presence of deregulation among the seven variables; the study uses 
this as a proxy to measure the degree of financial deregulation. 
 
BPDR= Bank Privatization/Denationalization and Restructuring. IRL= Interest Rate 
Deregulation/Deregulation. PRIDC= Prudential Regulation and Introduction of Indirect 
Policy Controls. DSCA= Direct/Selective Credit Abolition. FEB-DBL= Free Entry into 
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Bank-Deregulation of Bank Licensing. EXCL-DFEM= Exchange Rate Deregulation-
Deregulation of Foreign Exchange Market (introduction of autonomous exchange market and 
bureaux de change). CAPML-EDH= Capital Market Deregulation- Establishment of 
Discount Houses.   
 
Table 2: DF-GLS Unit Root Test (Optimal Lag Length Selection: SIC) 
Variables At Level (with intercept, no trend) 
 
Lag 
Length 
DF-GLS 
t-statistic 
1% 5% 10% 
L(SAV/GDP) 1 -1.059173 -2.627238 -1.949856 -1.611469 
L(CrPVT/GDP) 0 0.628132 -2.625606 -1.949609 -1.611593 
LGDP 0 2.25067 -2.625606 -1.949609 -1.611593 
RINTr 0 -3.809840*** -2.625606 -1.949609 -1.611593 
FinLB 0 -0.502907 -2.625606 -1.949609 -1.611593 
Variables At First Difference (with intercept, no trend)  
 
Lag 
length 
DF-GLS 
t-statistics 
1% 5% 10% 
Order 
Of 
Integration 
L(SAV/GDP) 0 
-
3.956053*** 
-
2.627238 
-
1.949856 
-1.611469 I(1) 
L(CrPVT/GDP) 0 
-
4.258340*** 
-
2.627238 
-
1.949856 
-1.611459 I(1) 
LGDP 0 
-
5.358386*** 
-
2.627238 
-
1.949856 
-1.611469 I(1) 
RINTr 3 
-
1.253165*** 
-
2.632688 
-
1.950687 
-1.611059 
I(0) and 
I(1) 
FinLB 1 
-
6.613282*** 
-
2.628961 
-
1.950117 
-1.611339 I(1) 
Source: Author’s Computation. Note: ***, **,*Indicates critical values; 1%, 5%, and 
10% respectively.  
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Table 3: Extracted from Pesaran et al (2010), Case III: Unrestricted Intercept, With No Trend  
 0.100 (10%) 0.050 (5%) 0.025 (2.5%) 0.010 (1%) 
K I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
3 2.72 3.77 3.23 4.35 3.69 4.89 4.29 5.61 
4 2.45 3.52 2.86 4.01 3.25 4.49 3.74 5.06 
5 2.26 3.35 2.62 3.79 2.96 4.18 3.41 4.68 
6 2.12 3.23 2.45 3.61 2.75 3.99 3.51 4.43 
Notes: Asymptotic critical value bounds are obtained from Table CI (iii) case III: unrestricted 
intercept and no trend for k = 4 (Pesaran et al, 2001). 
 
Cusum And Cusumsq Test For Stability 
For Equation 10: 
 
 
For Equation 11: 
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For Equation 12: 
 
For Equation 13: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
